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by Christopher R. Stones 
Editor-in-Chief 
 
Despite significant advances in our understanding of 
human behaviour and experience, there nonetheless 
remain widespread controversies in contemporary 
psychology regarding the appropriate best-practice 
methods and approaches for observing consciousness 
and the role that inner experience should play in 
psychological theorizing. To a significant extent, 
these differing - some might argue conflicting - 
orientations reflect methodological differences 
between natural science and human science 
approaches to the understanding of lived phenomena. 
In a recent article in American Psychologist, Howard 
Kendler (2005) argues that while philosophical 
phenomenology inter alia employs a human science 
approach to interpreting psychological and existential 
material (in other words, it seeks to understand human 
behaviour in terms of subjective existence), the 
natural sciences by contrast have adopted a 
methodological approach that is concerned primarily 
with cause-effect relationships as a mode of 
explanation. 
 
Kendler opens his paper entitled “Psychology and 
Phenomenology: A Clarification” with the bold 
statement that “Human existence is dominated by 
conscious experience” (p. 318) and then proceeds to 
argue that the science of understanding mind and 
behaviour must, by necessity, deal with consciousness 
and conscious experience. He argues that in this 
regard phenomenology focuses essentially on 
revealing the subjective aspects of consciousness and 
strives “…to reveal the core nature of conscious 
experience free of any scientific consideration or 
interpretation” (p. 318). 
 
Wilhem Wundt (1832-1920) devoted much of his 
intellectual life to the consideration that conscious 
experience is indeed proper subject material for 
Psychology and, moreover, he gave considerable 
attention to the issue of how best to understand the 
functioning - as well as subtle nuances - of 
consciousness itself. Wundt distinguished between 
immediate and mediate experience, the former being 
purely subjective and unmodified by preconceptions 
or past experience, while he considered mediate 
experience to be the result of one’s conceptualisation 
within a social context and influenced by one’s own 
life-history. By contrast, William James (1842-1910), 
simply but elegantly, accepted consciousness as it 
appears: “Introspective observation is what we have 
to rely on first and foremost and always” argued 
James (1890, p. 185). Although both agreed that 
conscious experience is in a constant state of flux they 
nevertheless were unable to arrive at consensus 
regarding the content of consciousness. While Wundt 
found that consciousness consisted of basic mental 
elements such as sensations, images and affects, 
James’ “stream of consciousness” consisted of high-
level integrated activities such as feelings, cognitions 
and desires. 
 
While these early psychologists were starting to 
observe consciousness in an objective (unbiased) 
fashion, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) was similarly 
seeking to describe consciousness in a manner that 
was free of preconceptions. He proposed a theory of 
subjectivity that aimed to reveal conscious experience 
that would be a reflection of one’s inner experiences 
or what came to be known as one’s “life-world”. 
Consequently, while early psychologists were 
attempting to observe conscious experience as it 
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appears in a reductionist fashion, Husserl was striving 
to observe consciousness from the perspective of 
human existence. Although this difference might 
appear facile, it nevertheless led to the fundamental 
distinction between a “natural science” approach and 
a “human science” approach to the understanding of 
consciousness and human existence.1 The 
comprehension of human action requires an ability to 
share a person’s conscious experience, and even 
though this might not be possible in an absolute purist 
fashion, it still is possible to achieve an understanding 
of human action without necessarily having to make 
use of a cause-effect paradigm. In this regard, 
Polkinghorne (1983) suggested that while 
 
the natural sciences investigate 
phenomena from the outside with the 
aim of identifying their causes, [the] 
human sciences study human 
phenomena from the inside with the 
goal of revealing their subjective 
meaning. (Kendler, 2005, p. 319) 
 
Of course, it should never be forgotten that because a 
person’s conscious experience is never completely 
accessible to any other person, the debate over 
trustworthy representations of consciousness will 
continue while, by contrast, natural science 
disagreements can be resolved by direct “public 
observations” of, for example, the effect of one body 
or agent upon another (Kendler, 2005, p. 319). 
 
A casual perusal of the literature indicates that there 
has tended to be a constant shift from, on the one 
hand, the goal of formulating behavioural theory 
through to, on the other hand, the goal of interpreting 
consciousness. Each of these has differing 
methodological approaches to theory construction: the 
one goal is that of interpreting human existence while 
the other aims to explain behaviour. The question 
obviously arises as to whether there truly is an 
“unbridgeable gap” (Kendler, 2005, p. 320) between a 
natural science and a human science approach to the 
understanding of cognitive behaviour and the 
mirroring of consciousness. Saul Bellow (1975), a 
noble Laureate, describes in one of his novels the 
inability of a character to know the desires of others: 
 
What did I really know of anyone? The only 
desires I knew were my own and those of 
nonexistent people like Macbeth or Prospero. 
                                                 
1 While natural science methodology is appropriate for procedures 
in chemistry, biology, physics and so on, the human science 
approach argues that human being is fundamentally different 
from inanimate objects in that there is the presence of 
consciousness. 
These I knew because the insight and 
language genius made them clear. (p. 416) 
 
In summing up the main thrust of his paper, Kendler 
has the following to say regarding phenomenological 
investigations: 
 
In sum, an intuitively valid description of 
another person’s conscious experience is 
akin to a form of artistry. Whether there is 
any basis to the presumed equivalence is 
immeasurable. The important point is that a 
phenomenological conviction is sufficient 
to justify the conclusion. Phenomenological 
conclusions, by themselves, can become 
convictions without additional support. 
Phenomenological convictions, in an 
epistemological sense, can be distinguished 
from scientific conclusions. (p. 320) 
 
Perhaps the difference between a human science 
approach and that of the natural sciences is best 
exemplified by considering the conflicting views of 
Goethe (1749-1832) and Newton (1642-1727) 
regarding the nature of light and its essence. Goethe 
argued that white light is a simple and pure 
experience. On the other hand, Newton was able to 
demonstrate that white light is a blend of hues that are 
revealed when light is passed through a prism 
resulting in a spectrum of colours. Although these 
fundamental notions of light would thus appear to be 
radically different, Kendler reminds us that, in a 
sense, both are correct: White light is simple and pure 
as it is ordinarily experienced but it can also be 
blended through a range of hues depending upon 
one’s methodology. Newton’s empirical approach 
represents the natural science methodology while 
Goethe’s is a phenomenological conviction. White 
light, then, is white-light in our conscious experience 
even though at a radically different level - that of 
physics - white light is anything but how it is 
ordinarily experienced. 
 
In this last edition of the IPJP for 2005, the papers 
presented arise from a firm human science 
perspective in which “phenomenological conviction” 
is the driving force leading to appropriate 
“phenomenological conclusions”. 
 
The opening piece “Dreams and Medicines: The 
Perspective of Xhosa Diviners and Novices”, written 
by Manton Hirst, deals with dreams and medicines 
arising from his work with Xhosa diviners in the 
Eastern Cape in South Africa. A fully initiated 
diviner, Dr Hirst has an active indigenous practise and 
is fluent in the home language (Xhosa) of the Eastern 
Cape. His paper is based on extensive anthropological 
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fieldwork that explores the interconnections between 
ancestors, who purportedly influence the lives of their 
descendents and communicate with them through 
dreams, and traditional medicines. His paper argues 
that the special aptitude or skill of the Xhosa diviner 
lies not simply in the ability to forecast or dream, but 
to grasp and articulate the significance underlying or 
hidden by appearances, whether of the ancestors in 
dreams or people in divination. To help readers better 
understand the intricacies of the relationship between 
ancestors, dreams and medicines, Dr Hirst provides a 
relatively extensive background to the notion of 
patrilineal clans, divination and religious beliefs 
within the local East Cape environment. The paper 
shows how communicating with ancestors through 
dreams, for instance, is a central facet of the diviner’s 
intuition and professional activity.  Hirst proceeds to 
present analyses of ancestor dreams within the 
context of indigenous healing and the use of 
medicinal plants. In particular, the paper explores the 
ritual significance of dreams and distinguishes 
between diviners and herbalists as well as between 
medicines and charms. Manton Hirst’s paper 
concludes with an examination of traditional Xhosa 
ideology within contemporary society. 
 
The second paper entitled “The Experience of Male 
Rape in Non-institutionalized Settings” by Gertie 
Pretorius and Richard Hull aims to describe the 
phenomenon of male rape from the victim’s 
perspective. This research relies heavily on 
transcendental phenomenology methodology (which 
is clearly described in a step-by-step fashion thus 
providing a methodological guide for the research 
novice) in order to create rich descriptions of the 
lived-experiences of three male survivors of rape. The 
paper proceeds to argue that the phenomenon of male 
rape has a dominant structure that is related to the 
destruction - and then re-construction - of the 
masculine self. Additionally, it explores several 
themes that include the characteristics of the assault 
itself, perceptions and feelings about the treatment 
and support that the victims received as well as the 
effects of the assault on the sense of self. Their paper 
also explores the victims’ willingness for future 
interpersonal disclosure and the significant life 
changes brought about as a direct consequence of the 
assault. Pretorius and Hull’s paper describes the 
phenomenon of male rape from a holistic perspective 
and aims to facilitate further descriptive case law in 
the hope that this will contribute significantly to a 
broader knowledge base of male rape and thus assist 
with its prevention and the subsequent healing 
process. 
 
The third paper from South Africa in this edition 
deals with the deeply traumatic experience of parental 
bereavement. “Give Sorrow Words: The Meaning of 
Parental Bereavement” (by Ann-Marie Lydall, Gertie 
Pretorius and Anita Stuart) embraces the theoretical 
tenet of hermeneutic phenomenology which is that 
people seek to create meaning of their experiences. In 
this regard, the paper outlines several aspects crucial 
to any hermeneutic phenomenological enquiry 
(helpful to any methodological novice). Their study is 
based on lived-experience as interpreted by the 
research participants themselves through recollections 
accessed by means of interviews. The authors 
emphasize the sensitive nature of the research, which 
was engaging with participants whose adult-child had 
died as a result of an AIDS-related illness. Using 
standard interview-recording and transcription 
processes to derive data, the analyses of the reported 
lived-experiences of bereavement were interwoven in 
an attempt to understand how the various experiences 
related to parental loss. The authors point to common 
themes that included parent reactions to first learning 
of the illness of their adult-children through to the 
experience of being with their dying child, and having 
to cope with the pain of loss and the concomitant 
spiritual and existential concerns. Themes of 
perceived divine retribution and punishment were 
also common and this placed a particularly heavy 
burden of sorrow on the grieving parents themselves. 
Lydall et al’s., phenomenological inquiry into the 
lived-experience of parental bereavement, especially 
after the death of an adult child as a result of 
HIV/AIDS provides useful insights into the lived-
experience of parental bereavement and the forging of 
new meaning structures that assist with 
accommodation to the experienced loss. 
 
Remaining within the Southern Hemisphere, Gabriel 
Rossouw and David Russell (New Zealand 
Psychologists), in a paper entitled “Death Mirrors the 
Spirit of Life”, aim to further understand how a soul 
comes to despair and how the spirit of life is 
wounded. This question is approached from a Jungian 
and existential–phenomenological perspective, and 
from the perspective of death enacted in the form of 
death-defying acts as a dialectical aspect of being and 
non-being. Rossouw and Russell argue that death can 
serve as a reflection of the life lived and the 
experience of who an individual is. Moreover, the 
relationship between ego and Self, it is argued, is 
critical in determining experiential identity. The paper 
proceeds to argue that when the relationship between 
ego and Self is fragmented there can arise a sense of 
omnipotence as the ego identifies with the Self but 
also, conversely, there can be a profound sense of 
alienation as the ego renounces itself thereby 
establishing an “intellectual vacuum” which becomes 
a substitute for lived-experience. Rossouw and 
Russell argue that whether there is a sense of 
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omnipotence or alienation, in both instances there is a 
growing despair and inauthenticity and the experience 
of non-being, which death-defying acts attempt to put 
an end to. This existential dilemma of meaningless 
and despair is brought into sharp focus by 
Kierkegaard’s (1983) notion of “despair to will to be 
rid of oneself.” The paper concludes that it is only 
when there is a conscious dialectic between ego and 
Self that an authentic existence becomes possible and 
that this represents the ongoing commitment to 
incarnate the human reality that exists between the 
world of imagination and the world as it appears to 
our senses.  
 
The last three articles in the current edition of the 
journal emanate from authors in the Northern 
Hemisphere and thus lie beyond the immediate 
mission of the IPJP which is to disseminate research 
amongst scholars in the Southern Hemisphere. 
However, it was considered appropriate for the 
journal to publish these papers since each falls within 
the broad project of phenomenology and each 
provides specific insights thus ensuring the journal 
remain inclusive and faithful to its phenomenological 
mandate. 
 
The philosophical treatment of friendship has enjoyed 
a revival in continental philosophy largely due to the 
influence of Emmanuel Levinas who argued that 
ethics is the proper topic of philosophy - as “first 
philosophy”. Noting this, Jack Marsh in his paper 
entitled “Friendship Otherwise - Toward a Levinasian 
Description of Personal Friendship” sets about to deal 
with the notion of personal friendship, ‘otherwise 
than political.’ He argues that a Levinasian reading of 
intimate and personal friendship suggests that it can 
be understood as a certain ‘fraternity’ and thus be 
legitimately employed in discussing justice and 
politics although such usage nonetheless trades on a 
certain equivocation.  In constructing an ethics of 
‘reciprocity’, of shared community, where friendship 
occurs as the mutual striving for the ‘good life’, for a 
certain virtue, real community occurs as equal 
exchange - as a ‘fragile balance in which giving and 
receiving are equal, hypothetically.’  Marsh argues 
that one’s ethical intention conditions moral sociality 
in the communal founding and maintenance of just 
institutions. In this regard, hermeneutics seeks to 
make the alien familiar, and deconstruction seeks to 
show how the familiar is always already alien. Marsh 
strives to describe personal friendship within both of 
these movements, that is, Hermeneutics on the one 
hand and Deconstruction on the other. The paper 
proceeds by sketching the broad contours of 
Levinas’s thought before offering a phenomenology 
of personal friendship in the wake of the limits that 
Levinas thematizes in his own analysis of the ethical 
relation. Readings and analyses presented suggest that 
personal friendship appears as an irreducible excess, 
reducible to neither ethics nor enjoyment, but 
nonetheless passing through ethics and enjoyment. 
Friendship thus marks a space of non-violent 
familiarity as a site of solidarity between identity and 
difference. 
 
The next paper (“Higher than Actuality - The 
Possibility of Phenomenology in Heidegger” by 
Michael Marder) deals with a schematic analysis of 
Heidegger’s notion of ‘possibility’ and considers the 
methodological significance held in Heidegger’s 
conception of what is essential in phenomenology as 
inhering not in its actuality as a philosophical 
movement but rather in the understanding of 
phenomenology as a possibility. Furthermore, the 
argument is put that the existential possibilities of 
Dasein and of phenomenological research are never 
distilled in a pure form from the impossible; only in 
and as the impossible does something like the (always 
impure) possibility of possibility arise. Moreover, 
argues Marder, that which is not ‘merely possible’, 
that which is other than actuality-in-waiting is, at the 
same time, possible and impossible. In concluding, 
the paper points to the efficacy of possibility and its 
mode of fulfilment as radically different from the 
actualization of latent potentiality. 
 
The final philosophical treatise in the current edition 
is that by Steven Segal which deals with “Narcissism, 
Nationalism and Philosophy in Heidegger”. Using the 
language of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology 
as developed in “Being and Time” (1962), Segal’s 
aim is to deconstruct the differences (unpack the 
dimensions) between Heidegger’s political text (“Self 
Assertion of the German University”) and the notion 
of “willing”, and Heidegger’s philosophical text 
(“What is Metaphysics?”) with the notion of 
“dawning”. Within the context of these two writings 
Segal argues that the difference between “willing” 
and “dawning” provides a basis for conceptualising a 
difference between Heidegger’s politics and his 
philosophy. In effect, Segal argues that within 
Heidegger’s political text, the attunement of Dasein 
centres on the notion of “willing” what-is, while in 
his philosophical text it is embedded in the notion of 
what-is “dawning” on Dasein. Defining narcissism as 
a preoccupation, under conditions of estrangement, 
with the mirrored self or nation, Segal’s paper seeks 
to understand Heidegger’s commitment to the notion 
of destiny associated with Greek and German 
philosophical traditions and how this encouraged him 
to associate with the Nazi socio-political movement 
(Polt, 1999) during its darkest days and at a time 
when Heidegger’s political text revealed an 
unwavering commitment to the destiny of the German 
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people regardless of the imperative of national 
socialism as espoused by the Nazi movement. In 
concluding his paper, Segal asserts that the difference 
between Heidegger’s philosophy and his politics 
revolves around the different ways in which he 
employs the notion of resoluteness.  His philosophy is 
characterised by a resolved deconstruction of “what-
is” while his politics is characterized by a 
territorialization of “what-is”: In his philosophy what-
is is said to “dawn” on Dasein while in his politics 
there is a willing of a relationship to what-is.  
In drawing this editorial to a close, readers are urged 
to take seriously the underlying assumption of the 
IPJP that phenomenology provides researchers with a 
unique research philosophy that allows them to 
explore issues central to the question of being human 
and thus enables the richness of human experience to 
be explicated. Moreover, it allows researchers to 
explore topics whose import lies beyond the reach of 
measurement and calibration, and in areas such as 
human meaning, values and truthfulness, as well as 
social relationships, bodily experience, emotional 
sentiment, mental states, and the contemporary 
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